The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) today released its report into a low-speed collision at Exeter St Davids station on 4 January 2010.
A full copy of the report is available here
Summary
At around 19:25 hrs on 4 January 2010, a passenger train from Barnstaple arriving over a level crossing and into platform 1 at Exeter St Davids station collided at a speed of approximately 11 mph (18 km/h) with the rear of another passenger train which was stationary in the same platform.
The RAIB investigation identified that:
- The immediate cause of the accident was that the driver’s application of the brakes did not stop the train before it collided with the stationary train.
- There was a length of low rail head adhesion on the approach to platform 1 at Exeter St Davids station which caused the train’s wheels to slide and prevented the brakes from working effectively.
- There was no sanding equipment fitted to the train. The application of sand would have improved the level of adhesion available.
- A large glass window in an internal door of the Barnstaple train became detached during the collision. Some of the welds designed to hold the glass in its frame were ineffective and the remaining welds were overloaded during the collision.
Recommendations
RAIB has already conducted an investigation into the causes of low adhesion on the national railway network . One of the recommendations made as a result of that investigation concerned the provision of sanding equipment on the type of train involved in the collision at Exeter St Davids. Rather than duplicate the recommendation, the RAIB has referred to it in the investigation report to reinforce the need to make progress with implementing the necessary work.
The RAIB also observed during its investigation that there is a possibility that rail head adhesion may be affected by contaminants drawn onto the railway from the road surface at level crossings. As a consequence of this incident, the RAIB has made one recommendation targeted at train operators covering the following area:
- train operators should, for locations where hazards exist immediately beyond a level crossing such as high risk signals, bay platforms or trains ahead, highlight within their route risk assessments the possibility of drivers encountering unexpected low adhesion conditions and the risk arising from wheel slide.
Notes to editors
1. The sole purpose of RAIB investigations is to prevent future accidents and incidents and improve railway safety. The RAIB does not establish blame, liability or carry out prosecutions.
2. For media enquiries, please call 020 7944 3248.
Newsdate: 21 June 2010
